[PREVIEW] BoE Policy Decision on 5th November 2026

Expected to hike by 25bps, to 4.00%. Likely subject to dissent, with Dhingra and Taylor seen voting for a hold, while Breeden is a risk. Focus then on any forward guidance, and while the statement may not be too explicit on this, individual member comments, Bailey’s Q&A and the new forecasts could be telling. OVERVIEW: Expected to hike the Bank Rate by 25bps to 4.00%, after being on hold throughout the Middle East conflict. A hike that is justified by the relative resilience of the UK economy, price pressures within the nation and the global macroeconomic and energy environment pointing to further pressures down the line. The main focus points will be the vote split, seen at 7-2 or 6-3 for a hike, and the degree, or lack of, hawkishness within any forward guidance. On that, even the likes of Chief Economist Pill have outlined a “sceptical” view on market pricing for 100bps of tightening, pushback that may well come from Governor Bailey himself, given his clear commentary in recent months. PREVIOUS MEETING: September’s meeting was a 6-3 hold at 3.75%, with Greene, Mann and Pill dissenting and voting for a 25bps hike. Much of the September announcement was focused on APF. On the economy, the inflationary risks were tilted to the upside and by a greater degree vs the July MPR. Further, outlining that it would not be appropriate to wait too long for evidence of second round effects before taking a policy response; however, there was little evidence of “material” second round effects in price- and wage-setting. DATA: September’s CPI was hotter-than-expected, with the annual rate jumping to 3.5% (prev. 3.1%), well above the BoE’s own forecast of 3.0% (3.047% unrounded). Further into the series, core was hotter at 2.8% (BoE exp. 2.7%), Services at 3.7% (BoE exp. 3.59%) and pertinent motor fuel 29.8% (BoE exp. 14.1%). Together, this alone is arguably enough to move a sufficient number of the MPC into the tightening camp; albeit, the core figure remains only marginally above consensus, and thus does not necessarily signal a significant departure from the September language on the topic. A finding that chimes with those who do not expect this to be the start of a protracted tightening cycle. August’s unemployment rate was better than expected, while pay growth remained “relatively stable”, according to the ONS, with incl. bonus at the lowest rate in an almost six year period. Elsewhere, August’s GDP was stronger than expected; however, the series was flattered by revisions, as August specifically had no services growth, but there were strong upward revisions to the prior two periods. Finally, but most recently, October’s PMIs were stronger than expected and ticked up from the prior. Pertinently for policymakers, the series pointed to one of the greatest rises in input prices over the past four years, driven by higher wage costs, rising fuel, energy and transportation prices and ongoing supply chain shocks. VOTE SPLIT: The vote is very likely to be subject to dissent, with Dhingra and Taylor seen as the primary candidates to vote for a hold. In September Dhingra said her view hadn’t really changed since July, and she continued to see value in “waiting for a clearer read on the durable scale of the shock over the coming months”. Adding, that there were “limited signs that upstream price pressures are broadening materially…”. Concluding that the “domestic economy appears unlikely to sustain second-round effects that would magnify the initial impulse”. Since then, she has said that financial conditions have done a lot of tightening work for the BoE already, and expressed concern that higher rates would impact investment and lower supply. A view, and recent remarks, that make her likely to dissent against tightening. Taylor, in September, explicitly stated that “additional tightening” was not warranted, as the Bank Rate remained materially above his 3% neutral estimate. More broadly, outlined that financial conditions were providing “meaningful insurance” against the risk the energy shock becomes embedded. Points that have only become more pertinent in the weeks since September’s meeting, and thus make him a probable dissenting vote. Breeden is the other potential candidate for dissent. Her commentary from September was very much focused on the presence of material second round effects. Concluding that “if risks to the outlook for second-round effects crystallise, it becomes increasingly appropriate for Bank Rate to respond”. Mid-October, Breeden said they are looking to see whether the energy shock is gone or just delayed. Since then, we have of course seen a re-ignition of geopolitical tensions and further energy upside. On balance, Breeden is more likely to err on the hawkish side of things given her recent commentary, hence the overall forecast for a 7-2 split, but a dovish dissent given the lack of material second round effects remains a real possibility. FORWARD GUIDANCE: The path ahead is uncertain given the fast moving nature of the energy shock, lack of overt second round effects and the points of uncertainty within the UK economy, despite it holding up relatively well in the recent period. Given this, the BoE may well take a leaf from the ECB’s book and go for a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to the cycle. With any explicit nod to further tightening or a specific meeting for such action a hawkish risk. Nonetheless, Governor Bailey will be questioned on this extensively. Elsewhere, the forecasts may provide insight into the expected cycle. Unsurprisingly, CPI Y/Y is expected to be revised much higher in the near term and peaking above 4% in H1 2027, given Brent and gas remain well above the previously assumed forecast levels. However, there is not a clear consensus on whether the forecasts will show CPI getting back to target within the horizon, a point that may inform participants on the BoE’s view around the magnitude of the tightening cycle. Further, the individual member statements could be telling, and potentially subject to dovish risk, if the MPC makes further action explicitly contingent on firm evidence of second round effects, or if anyone alludes to it being an insurance-style move. The latter is of note, as desks take this as the base-case, while market pricing remains overtly hawkish.